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Abstract The U.S. Forest Service and the U.S. Bureau of Land
Management (BLM) control large tracts of federal public lands.
Management goals for these tracts are described as ‘‘multiple-
use.’’ Some of the lands are forested, mountainous, contain
wildlife or possess other scenic and recreational attributes and
warrant the multiple-use designation; however, a signiﬁcant
portion, especially that under BLM control, contains little scenic,
recreation or wildlife value, thus offering little multiple-use
potential and non-pecuniary value. Inherent in the management
of all federal lands is a defacto ﬁduciary responsibility to
prudently and efﬁciently manage these assets. We develop a
framework that measures present values of both quantitative and
qualitative economic beneﬁts and costs of federal public lands
to assist managers and policy makers in determining future
management policy. By applying this framework, federal public
land policymakers may be aided in fulﬁlling their ﬁduciary
responsibilities.
The largest inventory of federal public lands in the United States is under the
control of the U.S. Department of Agriculture, via the U.S. Forest Service (USFS),
and the U.S. Department of Interior via the Bureau of Land Management (BLM).1
The largest proportion of these lands is found in the western United States,
although public lands exist in almost every state. The primary objective for both
USFS and BLM lands is multiple-use, where the deﬁnition of multiple-use is
managing a land area to simultaneously provide more than one of the following
resource objectives: ﬁsh and wildlife, wood products, recreation, aesthetics,
grazing, watershed protection, and historic or scientiﬁc values.2 Given these
multiple-use objectives, a de facto ﬁduciary responsibility to the public requires
that these lands be prudently, efﬁciently, and effectively managed.3 The purpose
of this paper is to develop a framework that measures the present values of both
quantitative/pecuniary and qualitative/non-pecuniary economic beneﬁts and costs
of federal public lands to assist managers and policy makers in determining future
management policy, and to assess the effectiveness and efﬁciency of surface rights
management for both types of federal public land.4
The paper addresses two issues. First, we develop a management model that
considers the present value of future multiple use attributes (both pecuniary and120  Spahr and Sunderman
non-pecuniary) and future management costs of individual public land parcels in
the decision to either continue to own and manage each parcel or sell the parcel
to private ownership. Inherent in the non-pecuniary attributes are multiple-use
attributes including scenic, recreational and hunting, as well as pecuniary attributes
including grazing and foresting. Much of the public land that we are speciﬁcally
targeting for inventorying is BLM land that is completely surrounded by private
land and contains little scenic or recreational value. We recognize that there may
be other alternatives that would improve management efﬁciency and effectiveness.
Speciﬁcally, the model may also assess the beneﬁt/costs of other modiﬁcations
of land use that may include changing management policy or selling the land to
private ownership. For example, this may include turning control of some parcels
over to the states in which the parcel is located.
We further use a hedonic model developed from private land sales in Wyoming
to estimate the value of public lands controlled by both the USFS and the BLM.
Because of the scope of this study and data availability, we limit our estimation
of the value of federal lands to USFS and BLM lands in the State of Wyoming;
however, we observe the entire operating budgets for both types of federal lands.
Even though we limit our estimation of federal land values to those lands located
in Wyoming, we are conﬁdent that much of our analysis also pertains to the value
of public lands in other western states, and to a somewhat lesser extent nationally,
since federal lands located in the western U.S. are very similar to public lands
located in Wyoming. Because of lower population density and lower potential
demand for lands in Wyoming, our valuation is a very conservative estimate of
the value of federal lands nationally. Higher values for public lands will enforce
our policy recommendations.
Although management goals for all lands controlled by these agencies are
described as multiple-use, some of the lands possess very few of the attributes to
provide signiﬁcant multiple-use contributions. Some of the lands are forested,
mountainous, contain wildlife or possess other scenic and recreational attributes
and warrant the federal multiple-use designation (signiﬁcant non-pecuniary
attributes); however, a signiﬁcant portion of the land, especially that under BLM
control, contains little scenic, recreation or wildlife value, thus offering very little
multiple-use potential. Much of the land not warranting multiple-use potential has
never been titled to anyone except the federal government (never sold nor
homesteaded). Since it is our ﬁnding that management inefﬁciencies, operating
deﬁcits, and bureaucratic overstafﬁng for USFS and BLM lands have created a
situation where government’s ﬁduciary responsibility may have been abrogated,
we suggest that all federal lands be inventoried with regard to multiple-use
attributes and be assessed on a beneﬁt-cost basis. Large operating deﬁcits resulting
from the management of USFS and BLM surface rights makes these lands an
expensive liability rather than an asset. Thus we posit that these agencies be
required to justify their continued defacto ownership of these lands.5Federal Public Land Surface Rights Management  121
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 History of USFS and BLM Lands
In 1812, Congress established the General Land Ofﬁce in the Department of the
Treasury to oversee the disposition of federal lands. As the nineteenth century
progressed and the nation’s land base expanded westward, Congress encouraged
the settlement of these lands by enacting a wide variety of laws.
The late nineteenth century marked a shift in federal land management policies,
where instead of using public lands to promote settlement exclusively, Congress
decided these lands should be held in public ownership because of their resource
values. The Taylor Grazing Act of 1934, speciﬁcally addressing surface rights,
established the U.S. Grazing Service to manage the public rangelands. In 1946,
the Grazing Service was merged with the General Land Ofﬁce to form the Bureau
of Land Management within the Department of the Interior. The BLM had no
uniﬁed legislative mandate until Congress enacted the Federal Land Policy and
Management Act of 1976. The act declared that these lands would remain in
public ownership, and created the term ‘‘multiple-use’’ management, deﬁned as
‘‘management of the public lands and their various resource values so that they
are utilized in the combination that will best meet the present and future needs of
the American people.’’6
Since 1996, federal grazing fees on USFS, BLM, and National Grasslands
(administered by the USFS) are set by presidential executive orders based on
formulas established by the Public Range Improvements Act (PRIA) passed by
Congress in 1978. The federal grazing fee for western public lands managed by
the BLM and the USFS was $1.79 per animal unit month (AUM) in 2005.7 These
rates are considerably lower than for private grazing rates provided by the USDA
Agricultural Marketing Service, which averaged $18.30 for western states.8 Thus,
current USFS and BLM grazing (lease) fees, a primary source of surface revenues,
appear to be low relative to reported market private rates.
The Multiple-Use Sustained-Yield Act of 1960 as amended through December 31,
1996, P.L. 104–333 states: ‘‘AN ACT To authorize and direct that the national
forests be managed under principles of multiple use and to produce a sustained
yield of products and services, and for other purposes.’’ Furthermore, it states:
That 16 U.S.C. 528A ` it is the policy of the Congress that the national
forests are established and shall be administered for outdoor recreation,
range, timber, watershed, and wildlife and ﬁsh purposes. The purposes
of this Act are declared to be supplemental to, but not in derogation
of, the purposes for which the national forests were established as set
forth in the Act of June 4, 1897 (16 U.S.C. 475). Nothing herein shall
be construed as affecting the jurisdiction or responsibilities of the
several States with respect to wildlife and ﬁsh on the national forests.
Nothing herein shall be construed so as to affect the use of
administration of the mineral resources of national forest lands or to122  Spahr and Sunderman
affect the use or administration of Federal lands not within national
forests.
The act continues:
SEC. 4. 16 U.S.C. 531A ` As used in this Act, the following terms shall
have the following meanings: (a) ‘‘Multiple use’’ means: The
management of all the various renewable surface resources of the
national forests so that they are utilized in the combination that will
best meet the needs of the American people; making the most judicious
use of the land for some or all of these resources or related services
over areas large enough to provide sufﬁcient latitude for periodic
adjustments in use to conform to changing needs and conditions; that
some land will be used for less than all of the resources; and
harmonious and coordinated management of the various resources, each
with the other, without impairment of the productivity of the land, with
consideration being given to the relative values of the various resources,
and not necessarily the combination of uses that will give the greatest
dollar return or the greatest unit output. (b) ‘‘Sustained yield of the
several products and services’’ means the achievement and maintenance
in perpetuity of a high level annual or regular periodic output of the
various renewable resources of the national forests without impairment
of the productivity of the land.
The USFS planning regulations (Federal Register, Volume 47 (190): 43026-43052)
require maximization of net public beneﬁt, which includes net present value of
all multiple-use outputs (market and non-market values), along with multiple use
values that are quantitative but not expressed in dollars, and qualitative beneﬁcial
effects as well. The BLM Federal Land Policy and Management Act directives
for multiple use management have a parallel deﬁnition of multiple use from
Congress (see Swanson and Loomis, 1996).
The USFS Program for Forest and Rangeland Resources (1990) includes the
monetary value of outdoor recreation and wildlife (calculated using federally
accepted methods). It suggests that recreation is one-third the value of the National
Forests and wildlife habitat is approximately 25% of the value of the National
Forests. Grazing, in the USFS Program, represents less than 2% of the value of
the National Forests.9 The monetary valuation model developed below, however,
may be applied to all federal public lands when considering pecuniary land
attributes. If pecuniary attributes do not justify retaining ownership of a tract of
public land, ownership may be justiﬁed by non-pecuniary values, such as esthetic
multiple-use values to the public.
The public often implicitly assumes that all public lands are the pristine ‘‘National
Forests’’ that we all wish to conserve. However, much of the land controlled by
he BLM and some of the land controlled by the USFS contains no forests, has
very little recreational potential, and provides very little wildlife habitat. TheseFederal Public Land Surface Rights Management  123
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lands that are currently leased for ‘grazing rights’ possess little value other than
as grazing land. These are the lands that should be inventoried with regard to a
beneﬁt-cost assessment to determine their value with regard to future federal
ownership or potential sale.
Current Controversy
In most western states, the surface rights for farms and ranches are likely to consist
of deeded property with accompanying federal and/or state leases/permits. It is
common practice that when ranches and farms are sold, public land leases are
transferred along with the sale of the deeded real property. Private lease rates have
been used historically as indicators of the value of public leases, thus since private
lease rates for comparable lands are generally higher than public lease rates, public
leases and permits may have value. Thus it is commonly believed that public
leases are priced below fair market value, where the difference in the intrinsic
value and grazing fee rate is capitalized in the sale price of farms and ranches.10
Numerous arguments have been made for and against current federal management
policies focusing on surface leasing, where surface leasing has generally been for
grazing leases. The issue of grazing leases and other revenues from surface rights
on public lands is a politically contentious topic; however, we wish to skirt this
issue and concentrate on the ﬁnancial effectiveness and efﬁciency of current
management policy and suggest possible alternatives.11
Previous Work
Previous related work by Sunderman, Spahr, and Bunyan (2004) and Sunderman
and Spahr (2006) assess whether current management policy fulﬁlls ﬁduciary
obligations with respect to maximizing investment returns generated on Wyoming
school trust lands through grazing leases. To estimate returns on school trust lands,
they estimated both the realized annual revenues and the market value of the trust
lands. Both papers used hedonic models to estimate market values of school trust
lands and then estimated returns from realized surface lease revenues. The
estimated rate of return on market value was compared with the most likely
alternative scenario that assumes the land were sold and the proceeds were
reinvested in long-term U.S. Treasury securities.12 We apply a similar methodology
for BLM and USFS surface rights.
 Model for Trust Land Policy
Inherent in the management of federal public lands is a defacto ﬁduciary
responsibility to prudently, efﬁciently, and effectively manage these lands. Given
that objectives and desired utilization of federal public lands is ‘‘multiple-use,’’
we develop a model that considers both the beneﬁts from multiple-use and the
BLM and USFS ﬁduciary responsibilities to prudently manage these lands. We
assume that public land managers have two alternative choices for each land124  Spahr and Sunderman
parcel. One alternative is to continue public ownership of surface rights and
current stewardship. This would result in generating future public non-pecuniary
(scenic, recreation, wildlife, etc.) and pecuniary beneﬁts (fee or lease revenues),
as well as incurring management expenses. Alternatively, the second choice is to
sell the land and use the proceeds for alternative public beneﬁt.13 Since
preservation of the public multiple-use value is the goal for federal lands, it is
logical that the economic opportunity cost of holding federal lands is the long-
term U.S. Treasury rate that could be earned on their market value.
A once and for all sale and public reinvestment decision is similar to Vitaliano
and Hill’s (1994) conversion of farm land from agricultural production to non-
farm uses and Wicksell’s classic problem of the timing of the cutting of a forest
(see Bentick and Pogue, 1988). Assuming that sales and reinvestment costs are
negligible, the decision for policymakers is between continuing to receive a
possibly growing stream of revenue payments and possibly a growing steam of
operating expenses or alternatively, to receive a ﬁxed public beneﬁt or stream of
revenues from the reinvestment of sales proceeds. Given the model’s determination
of the tradeoff between continuing to own each speciﬁc land parcel and the public
beneﬁts of sale of the parcel, any shortfall may then be compared with the future
steam of public non-pecuniary beneﬁts accrued from multiple-use.14
Model for USFS and BLM Federal Lands
A model for USFS and BLM lands is developed, where the discounted present
value of beneﬁts received from a land parcel is Vt. Also, let L1 denote the current
annual revenue from fees or leasing a particular parcel of public land, and gL is
the expected annual growth rate in these fee or lease revenues. Also, let E1 denote
current operating expenses for the parcel under consideration, where gE is the
expected annual growth rate in these operating expenses. Proceeds from the sale
of the parcel at time t are denoted as St (current sales price is S1), where the sales
price is expected to grow at gS until the date of the sale. Once the sale has
occurred, it is assumed that the proceeds will be invested in long-term U.S.
Treasury securities for perpetuity with a yield of r. Payments in lieu of taxes
(PILT) to local governments is another expense for federal lands, thus p denotes
the rate at which PILT are paid on lease revenues, L1, and gp represents the annual
growth rate in PILT.15 Thus, the present discounted value of beneﬁts to the federal
government received from a parcel of public federal land, Vt, is given by:
(g r)t (g r)t LE 1  e 1  e
V  L  E   t 11 r  gr  g LE
(g r)t (g r)t SL rS e 1  e 1  pL , (1)  1 rr  gp
where, t  1,2,....Federal Public Land Surface Rights Management  125
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PV SALE AT t
PV EXPENSES PER ACRE
PV PILT PER ACRE
PV CONTIN TO LEASE
PV FUTURE REINVEST
t12
Notes: Lease rate  $1.79 per AUM, land value  $500.62 per acre, appreciation rate  5%, lease appre-
ciation rate  2%, operating cost per acre  $25.52, U.S. Treasury rate  6.2%.
The ﬁrst term in (1) represents the present value of annual fee/lease payments
(revenue), growing at gL, until the land is sold at time t. The second term
represents the present value of operating expenses associated with the parcel in
question until the parcel is sold at time t. The third term represents the present
value of annual interest on reinvested sales proceeds subsequent to the sale of the
land at time t. The fourth term represents the present value of PILT payments
until the land is sold at time t.16
We base land policy decisions on nominal interest rates, and growth rates rather
than real rates. Also, because of inﬂation and increasing demand for federal public
land caused by population growth or other factors, we allow for different growth
rates over time for annual surface right fee/lease payments, annual management
operating budgets, and sale prices of the land parcels. The land management
problem, under some circumstances, is to select an optimal date of sale. The
normal approach for economists is to differentiate (1) with respect to t and setting
each equal to zero to ﬁnd the value maximizing sales date, t*. However, Vt in (1)
is a function of three geometric series and may contain localized maxima or
minima, a potential problem when solving for t*. Thus, we consider the
methodology used by Vitalliano and Hill (1994) as impractical in this application
since it could result in suboptimal decisions. Rather than solving for t*, we use a
simple spread sheet iterative/graphical approach to ﬁnd t*. Graphs representing
the iterative approach are displayed in Exhibits 1 and 2. The parameters for these
exhibits are developed below.17126  Spahr and Sunderman










0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50

































PV SALE AT t
PV EXPENSES PER ACRE
PV PILT PER ACRE
PV CONTIN TO LEASE
PV FUTURE REINVEST
t12
Notes: Lease rate $1.79 per AUM, land value  $500.62 per acre, appreciation rate  5%, lease appre-
ciation rate  2%, operating cost per acre  $5.66, U.S. Treasury rate  6.2%.
 Data and the Hedonic Model
Under current management policy, pecuniary revenues from surface rights on
USFS and BLM lands are generated mainly from lease revenues and appreciation
of surface right values. To determine the return on monetary investment that the
USFS and BLM are currently achieving on these public lands, we must estimate
the value of these lands. Public land values are estimated using hedonic MRA
models for lands located in Wyoming.
Data used in pricing land consist of 1,725 private land sales from 22 of the 23
counties in Wyoming.18 All sales occurred between January 1989 and June 2003.
Land sales data include both productive and nonproductive characteristics of
individual operating ranches and farms where some sales included only BLM or
Forest Service leases.
Land sales with less than 100 deeded acres are omitted from the data set, because
such parcels, generally hobby farms and ranches, would not represent tracts of
land similar to public land parcels. Sales with deeded property and/or leases or
permits outside of Wyoming are also eliminated from the data. Other exclusions
are made because of incomplete data for individual sales. The resulting data set
contains 1,431 land sales. The typical property sold for $605,884, with 3,691 acres
of deeded land, 1,926 deeded animal unit months (AUMs), 510 leased AUMs,Federal Public Land Surface Rights Management  127
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and an average per acre price of $436. A description of the variables is included
in Exhibit 3.
Since our objective is the estimation of the fair market value and capital
appreciation rates of USFS and BLM lands located in Wyoming, price per acre
is deﬁned as the dependent variable. A linear functional form hedonic model is
used to capture the effects of various attributes on land values. Explanatory
variables incorporate and control for each unit’s income producing ability,
location, and market conditions. Results from previous studies and the availability
of data also inﬂuenced the selection of explanatory variables.19
The log of deeded acres (LDACRE) is used to control for possible economies of
scale and possible nonlinear relationships between deeded acres and the price per
acre. The log of deeded acres is used to control of economies of scale since
generally it is observed that larger farms and ranches sell for lower price per acre.
QUALITY, the ratio of deeded AUMs to deeded acres, is employed to control for
the difference in the productive quality of land.20
Land productivity or quantity of available forage (in AUMs) is divided into two
groups, deeded forage and leased forage. Grazing leases consist of section 3
(Taylor Grazing Act) BLM, section 15 (Taylor Grazing Act) BLM, State of
Wyoming school trust, USFS permits, and private leases. Each variable reﬂects
the percentage of total AUMs represented by lease type. Section 3 BLM leases
generally consist of larger acreage or tracts of land that may represent an interest
in a grazing association or at least represent a larger scale lease. Section 15 BLM
leases generally are those tracts that are interspersed among ranches’deeded acres.
Often, section 15 tracts are lands that were never homesteaded or purchased from
the federal government. These tracts usually have the least desirable terrain and
usually contain little water. Since deeded AUMs, as a percentage of total AUMs,
is not included in the model, the coefﬁcients on these variables represent either a
discount or premium in relation to deeded AUMs
Many land sales includes permanent improvements such as buildings and
equipment essential to the agricultural operation, thus we include the estimated
value of real improvements as an explanatory variable.
A major factor inﬂuencing the sale price is each property’s unique scenic and/or
recreational attributes. A subjective assessment of this factor is used as a basis for
constructing ﬁve dummy variables: POOR, FAIR, AVERAGE, GOOD, and
EXCELLENT.21
A USDA/USDI (1993) study, which includes Wyoming as one of the three test
states, classiﬁed regionalized forage values into clustered intrastate allotments
based on 21 different ecoregions. Six of these ecoregions (3, 4, 5, 7, 8, and 9)
are found in the counties studied in Wyoming. The ecoregions represent a
composite set of ecological boundaries identiﬁed by differences in soil, vegetation,
landform, climate, and use. Using ecoregion to control for location in the model
made more sense than the use of county lines, which are political and have no
impact on value.128  Spahr and Sunderman
Exhibit 3  Description of Variables
Variable Descriptions
Grazing Lease Variables
BLM3AUM% Section 3 BLM Grazing Lease AUMs/Total AUMs
BLM15AUM% Section 15 BLM Grazing Lease AUMs/Total AUMs
STATEAUM% State Lease AUMs/Total AUMs
FORSTAUM% Forest Service Grazing Permit AUMs/Total AUMs
PRVTAUM% Private Lease AUMs/Total AUMs
Real Property
REAL/ACRE Real Property/Deeded Acres
Deeded AUM and Deeded Acres Variables
LDACRES Log of Deeded Acres
IRCAUM% Irrigated Crop Land AUMs/Deeded AUMs
IRHAUM% Irrigated Hay Land AUMs/Deeded AUMs
DRYAUM% Dry Crop Land AUMs/Deeded AUMs
SUBBAUM% Subirrigated, Improved, or Bottom Grazing Land AUMs/
Deeded AUMs
FTMNTPER% Foothills and Mountain Grazing Land AUMs/Deeded
AUMs
OTHERAUM% Dry Grazing Land or Undeﬁned Deeded AUMs/Deeded
AUMs
QUALITY Deeded AUMs/Deeded Acres
Scenic/Recreational Dummy Variables
POOR Dummy Variable for Ranches with Limited Scenic and/or
Recreational Value
FAIR Dummy Variable for Ranches with Little Scenic and/or
Recreational Value
AVERAGE Dummy Variable for Ranches with Average Scenic and/
or Recreational Value
GOOD Dummy Variable for Ranches with Good Scenic and/or
Recreational Value




ECO7, ECO8, and ECO9
ECEEE EC
Dummy Variables Representing Location Based on
Ecoregion
Condition of Sale Dummy Variables
ARMS Arms-Length Transaction Sale
STRESS Stress Sale
AUCTION Auction Sale
LESSARMS Less than an Arms-Length Transaction Sale
FORECLO Foreclosure Sale
Date of Sale Variables
B89S1 to B03S1 Weighted time variable for the beginning of the semi-
annual period listed. These variables are for the data
from 1989–2003.Federal Public Land Surface Rights Management  129
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The date of sale variable, as incorporated in the model, controls for changing
market prices throughout the time period of the study. The method used is a variant
of the time variable approach suggested by Bryan and Colwell (1982).22 There is
a date of sale variable for each half-year in which sales occurred, with half-years
beginning on January 1 or July 1 for all years in the study.23 This approach allows
the rate of change in prices to be different for each half-year and allows a monthly
price continuum rather than a step function.
Two additional criteria are used to eliminate very unusual sales. Sales are deleted
if price is greater than three standard errors above or below the predicted sale
price. This large predictive error may result from model misspeciﬁcation, a lack
of sufﬁciently detailed information regarding the property and/or incorrect sales
data. The second criterion eliminates any sales with unusually large absolute
values for Cook’s distance (1.00). This indicates that the property has one or
more characteristics that are quite different from other sales, and whose presence
has an unduly large inﬂuence on the overall predicted values generated by the
model.24 These additional criteria result in the removal of less than 1.2% of all
data.25
The model is developed forcing the intercept through zero so that a land with zero
acres and no other attributes will have a zero price per acre. A nonzero intercept
implies that a property with no attributes would have a value equal to the
intercept.26
 Empirical Results for Hedonic Pricing Model
Referring to Exhibit 4, the hedonic model represents a good ﬁt where the adjusted
R2 is 0.8990. Due to possible concerns over multicollinearity among independent
variables, variance inﬂation factors (VIF) were run on all model variables. It was
found that except for the variables LDACRES and ECO8 all were highly acceptable
(10.0), indicating that the model is not subject to problems of multicollinearity.27
Empirical results indicate that land type and productivity signiﬁcantly impact price
per acre. For example, higher percentages of total AUMs attributed to irrigated
crop (IRCAUM), irrigated hay (IRHAUM), and subirrigated, improved, or bottom
grazing land (SUBBPER) translate into higher per acre prices when compared to
dry grazing land.
Similar to previous studies, scenic/recreational variables provide major
contributions.28 For land held primarily for production (POOR and FAIR),
scenic/recreation attributes have little impact on the price per acre; however, more
scenic land had scenic/recreation premiums of $105.42 (AVERAGE), $281.40
(GOOD), and $320.80 (EXCELLENT) per acre over lands rated as POOR. More
scenic/recreational land values will translate into lands containing higher alternate
or multiple-use attributes for public lands and may represent public lands more
desirable for public use, such as forests, mountains, and wildlife habitat.130  Spahr and Sunderman
Exhibit 4  The Hedonic Model
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Exhibit 4  (continued)
The Hedonic Model
























Note: The dependent variable is Price Per Acre.
The ecoregion in which a land sale is located also signiﬁcantly impacts the price
per acre. This is also the case for land productivity (as measured by QUALITY),
where as expected increasing productivity signiﬁcantly impacts prices.
The impact on leased lands that accompany deeded land sales may have an impact
on the total sales price. BLM leases tend to either reduce or have no impact on
deeded land sales, whereas the transfer of state leases signiﬁcantly increases
property values.
The results also indicate that real improvements to the land, valued by the
appraiser at $1.00 per acre, tend to increase property values by $1.67 per acre.132  Spahr and Sunderman
Agricultural operations with real improvements are generally those that are well
maintained and have improved facilities. Therefore, real improvements may be
acting as a comprehensive measure for all improvements.29
Using the results of the hedonic model displayed in Exhibit 4, the price per acre
and the value of a section (640 acres) may be estimated for each ecoregion. The
following assumptions were made to arrive at these estimates: (1) each USFS or
BLM section has a QUALITY rating equal to the average value for the ecoregion
in which it is located; (2) date of valuation is January 2003; (3) the scenic/
recreational attribute used is the average observed value for the given ecoregion;
(4) there are no real improvements; and (5) the land is assumed to be dry grazing
land. The estimated values and the assumptions used are shown in Panels A and
C of Exhibit 5.
Panel A of Exhibit 5 indicates that average land prices for ecoregions in Wyoming
range from $500.62 to $900.33 per acre.30 Price variation among ecoregions results
from differing land quality and scenic/recreational characteristics. For example,
ecoregion 7 on average is mountainous, very scenic, and annually produces 2.0162
AUMs per acre. Thus, prices in this ecoregion are higher. Alternatively, ecoregion
3, mostly farm land, has even higher productivity (2.5353 AUMs per acre), but
because of poor scenic/recreational land potential, the values are signiﬁcantly
lower. Higher land values in ecoregion 7 also may be attributed to a greater
desirability for alternate or multiple-uses, whereas, land values in ecoregion 3 are
based more on productivity. Thus, it is argued that like ecoregion 3, land in
ecoregions 4 and 8 are also likely held primarily for productivity and the potential
multiple-use pecuniary value of public lands in these ecoregions may be relatively
low.
Panel B of Table 3 displays the average AUMs per section, the expected lease
revenue per section, assuming each section is fully leased, and the resulting
percentage return on market values assuming a lease rate of $1.79 per AUM for
federal lands in effect as of January 2005. In addition to returns resulting from
lease revenues, total average pecuniary annual returns on USFS and BLM lands
must also include the annual rate of appreciation of land values.31 It was found
that between 1989 and 2003 annual nominal appreciation rates for different
ecoregions ranged between 4.95% and 11.16%.
The results from Exhibit 5 suggest that lease returns range from 0.17% to 0.91%
for federal lands.32 When land appreciation is included, returns increase; the
highest return is in ecoregion 3 (12.26%) and the lowest return is for lands located
in ecoregion 7 (5.35%). Given that the annual compound rate of inﬂation, as
calculated from the Consumer Price Index from 1989 to January 2003 is
approximately 2.86%, real rates of return, including price appreciation, were
between 2.49% and 9.40%. Alternatively, given, an average nominal return of
approximately 6.2% on 10-year U.S. Treasury bonds over this same time period,
real rates of return that could have been received by investing in U.S. Treasury

































































Exhibit 5  Estimate of Value per Wyoming Ecoregion
ECO3 ECO4 ECO5 ECO7 ECO8 ECO9
Panel A: Estimate of Valuea
Price Per Acre $500.62 $523.44 $610.07 $900.33 $537.93 $693.21
Price per Section $320,397 $335,002 $390,445 $576,211 $344,275 $443,654
Panel B: Estimated AUMs and Revenue
AUMs Per Sectionb 1623 477 409 1290 1228 424
Lease Revenuec Federal Lands $2,905 $854 $732 $2,309 $2,198 $759
Return on Lease 0.91% 0.25% 0.19% 0.40% 0.64% 0.17%
Appreciationd 11.16% 10.38% 8.24% 4.95% 9.94% 6.91%
Total Return 12.26% 10.63% 8.43% 5.35% 10.58% 7.08%
Panel C: Section C—Assumptionse
Quality 2.535 0.746 0.639 2.016 1.919 0.662
Average Scenic Area Valuef 1.405 2.140 3.000 3.503 2.051 3.283
Notes:
aThese estimates are generated from the hedonic equation shown in Exhibit 4 (see Endnote 30).
bThis value is based on 640 acres times the quality ﬁgure.
cWe are using the AUM ﬁgures from the previous row and the lease rates of $179 per AUM for Federal lands that were in place in 2005.
dSee endnote 31.
eThese assumptions are based on the average values for all sales in the given ecoregion.
fPOOR  1, FAIR  2, AVERAGE  3, GOOD  4, and EXCELLENT  5.134  Spahr and Sunderman
Using longer-term U.S. Treasury rates as the opportunity cost, annually
compounded returns to taxpayers would have been lower in some ecoregions and
higher in others if lands had been sold in 1989 and the proceeds used for public
beneﬁt. However, differences exist in implied pecuniary revenues received over
this time period. If lands were sold and proceeds used for public beneﬁt, all returns
would have been realized and could have been used for the public good. By
continuing to lease, only the portion of pecuniary returns represented by lease
revenues would be realized and any opportunity cost would need to be compared
to non-pecuniary multiple-use beneﬁts enjoyed by society from using the land.
Again, it must be pointed out that the above analysis does not take into
consideration any operating expenses for managing the surface rights of public
lands.
From the potential external investor viewpoint and actual realizable market prices,
we may be upward biasing federal land values. Surface right value, as measured
by hedonic models, implicitly assumes that each land parcel is priced as an integral
component of an agricultural operation in which the federal land is currently
included. Land values also may be biased upward because of the preferred right
of renewal, the fact that some states are fence out states,33 as well as possible
access problems for outside investors. On the other hand, because of the low
population density of Wyoming, federal public lands in Wyoming may have lower
values than other states due to lower demand.
Due to structural factors that may affect the demand for public lands, we suggest
that public land trustees evaluate the methods by which land is sold. Currently, it
is required that state-managed school trust lands in Wyoming be sold at public
auction. Our results demonstrate that public auctions, for structural reasons
mentioned above, result in lower prices for sales of deeded properties than
conventional arms length sales. We assume this would also be the case for USFS
and BLM lands. Thus, if public lands were sold using a non-truncated bidding
process with minimum acceptable bids, prices may more closely approximate
estimated market values.
 Application of Model
Exhibits 1 and 2 represent respectively, an application of the policy model,
equation 1, for individual USFS and BLM land parcels, and apply average
parameter estimates for land located in Wyoming’s ecoregion 3. Parameter
averages for ecoregion 3 are a per acre value of S1  $500.62, annual productivity
of 2.5353 AUM per acre, estimated future growth rate in land values of gS  .05,
estimated growth rate in lease fees of gL  .02 even though no increase in lease
fees were observed during the duration of this study. Parameters also include an
opportunity cost of an estimated return on long-term U.S. Treasury securities of
r  .062 and payment in lieu of taxes (PILT) for federal lands of 25% of lease
fee revenue. Exhibits 1 and 2 would suggest that given the current (2005) annual
lease fee of $4.54 per acre ($1.79 per AUM), the federal land parcel underFederal Public Land Surface Rights Management  135
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consideration should be sold and the proceeds be used for the public good with
an opportunity rate equal to longer-term U.S. Treasuries.
The application of the policy models for ecoregion 3 represents, from a purely
pecuniary or economic perspective, the most likely ecoregion for public lands to
be retained and continued to be leased since this is essentially farmland, which
sells at a lower price per acre, but has the highest productivity and highest lease
rates per acre. However, even for this ecoregion, a decision based solely on
pecuniary value would suggest that the land be sold. The public policy model
observations for lands in other ecoregions, which sell for higher prices and with
lower productivity and lease revenues, suggest that all lands be sold and proceeds
reinvested if the decision is based only on pecuniary reasons. Continued ownership
of these public lands must be justiﬁed mainly on non-pecuniary values or the
property’s recreation/scenic and multiple-use value.
Since the ‘‘multiple-use’’ mission of USFS and BLM lands emphasizes many non-
pecuniary land attributes discussed above, we would expect that surface right
returns on federal public lands to be relatively low. If a dollar value could be
placed on non-pecuniary beneﬁts of some land parcels, attributes such as forests,
mountains, wildlife habitat, and other factors contributing to the scenic and
recreation value, would provide a signiﬁcantly high present value of beneﬁts to
cost ratio. However, a signiﬁcant portion of the land inventory of the BLM and
some of the land managed by the Forest Service contain minimal non-pecuniary
value, thus the beneﬁts of these parcels are mainly grazing leases. The returns on
these parcels are characterized in Exhibit 5.
Annual budget information, revenues, and expenses for the USFS and BLM are
presented in Exhibit 6. The USFS market-based annual returns (land market value
roughly estimated at $192 billion) on surface rights, annual returns from grazing
leases, are estimated at approximately 0.003%, and the overall net return from all
revenues less budgeted expenses is between 2.3% and 2.9%. Annual returns
on grazing for BLM lands (market value roughly estimated at $124.3 billion) are
estimated at approximately 1%, and the overall net return from all revenues less
budgeted expenses is between 0.8% and 1.8% from 2002 through 2006. USFS
and BLM budgeted operating expenses per acre are estimated at $29.75 and
$13.58, respectively, as estimated from their 2005 expected budgets; 2006
operating expenses per acre are slightly lower than for previous years. High
budgeted operating budgets may result from management inefﬁciency and
overstafﬁng. These chronic operating deﬁcits result in public lands essentially
being an expensive liability rather than an asset of the federal government.
The justiﬁcation for incurring annual operating deﬁcits of approximately $5.53
billion in 2005 for the USFS and $2.10 billion in 2005 for the BLM is the
‘‘multiple-use’’ objective and the non-pecuniary beneﬁts to the American people.
The question is: Are these non-pecuniary beneﬁts worth the cost? This question
should be answered for each land parcel.
An alternative application of the policy decision model is to estimate the minimum
level and growth rate in lease fees that would be necessary to make policymakers136  Spahr and Sunderman
Exhibit 6  Annual Revenue, Expenses and Returns for Federal Public Lands
Exhibit 7  Grazing Fees—USFS and BLM* from 1981 to 2006 ($ per AUM)
Year Fee Year Fee Year Fee
1981 $2.31 1990 $1.81 1999 $1.35
1982 $1.86 1991 $1.97 2000 $1.35
1983 $1.40 1992 $1.92 2001 $1.35
1984 $1.37 1993 $1.86 2002 $1.43
1985 $1.35 1994 $1.98 2003 $1.35
1986 $1.35 1995 $1.61 2004 $1.43
1987 $1.35 1996 $1.35 2005 $1.79
1988 $1.54 1997 $1.35 2006 $1.56
1989 $1.86 1998 $1.35
Notes: Grazing lease fees on USFS and BLM Lands have been tied to the Public Rangelands
Improvement Act of 1978 (PRIA) formula and have not tended to increase over the 1981 through
2005 time period. Fees are charged for grazing on approximately 169 million acres of BLM land
and 95 million acres of Forest Service land. Lease rates were obtained from the CRS Report for
Congress: http://www.nationalaglawcenter.org/assets/crs/RS21232.pdf.
*The national grassland fee is $1.90 per AUM in 2005, up from $1.52 in 2004.Federal Public Land Surface Rights Management  137
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indifferent between continued lease/ownership of the land and selling/proceed
reinvestment. For USFS and BLM, land management and operating expenditures
of approximately $25.06 per acre for USFS (see Exhibit 7) and approximately
$13.59 per acre for BLM are observed. Thus, lease fees in ecoregion 3 would
need to be in excess of $20 per AUM for USFS and in excess of $10 per AUM
for BLM to economically justify the continued ownership of the lands. For other
ecoregions this minimum rate would increase substantially because of lower
productivity.
We do not display the tables for all ecoregions because of space limitations; only
ecoregion 3 ﬁgures are displayed. Even with an increase in lease fees to $20 or
$10 per AUM, it is difﬁcult to justify retaining ownership of lands in ecoregions
4, 5, 7, and 9 unless alternative income is available and/or the non-pecuniary
beneﬁts on these public lands is high. Since we are assuming that each parcel is
leased to capacity, these lease rates are probably unrealistic since most public
lands are leased at signiﬁcantly less than capacity.
 Conclusions and Policy Implications
We address the continued ownership and control of federal public lands, mostly
located in the western U.S., when non-pecuniary attributes may not override a low
beneﬁts/costs ratio of pecuniary attributes. When pecuniary beneﬁts fail to justify
continued ownership and the land possesses insufﬁcient non-pecuniary value to
override the lack of pecuniary beneﬁts, we assume an alternative action—selling
the land parcel. Also, we question the control of public lands by two government
agencies, each replete with its own bureaucracy.
This study develops a model that may be used as a management tool for individual
parcels of federal public lands. This model may be used to improve the efﬁciency
and effectiveness of surface right management policy and pecuniary and non-
pecuniary return performance for managers of these lands. The model assesses
the present value of future economic/pecuniary beneﬁts derived from individual
parcels of public land regarding whether each parcel should be sold or retained.
The model may also assess the beneﬁt/costs of other modiﬁcations of land use
that may include alternatives other than maintaining the status quo. Other
alternative management policies may also be compared to selling the lands to
private ownership. Again, it is thought that a viable alternative may include turning
control of some parcels over to the states in which the parcels are located.
The model may assist policymakers’ estimates of the present value of pecuniary
beneﬁts relative to the management and opportunity costs for selected public land
parcels. We also estimate the return on market value generated by pecuniary
returns, allowing an estimate of the present value of non-pecuniary (multiple use
value in addition to economic value) beneﬁts that may be necessary to justify
continued ownership. Market values of public lands are estimated using a data set
of land sales in Wyoming. We apply hedonic modeling to estimate fair market138  Spahr and Sunderman
values of both USFS and BLM lands, allowing us to compare not only present
value of beneﬁts versus costs but also returns on these lands with an alternative
scenario of selling the lands and using the proceeds for the public beneﬁt.
Returns on USFS and BLM surface rights in Wyoming, as well as for many other
western states, are generated from agricultural or grazing lease income and capital
appreciation in land values. We ﬁnd that returns generated on public lands in
Wyoming were largely based on land appreciation and generally less than 1%
return from grazing lease revenues. Even when including future appreciation, total
returns would typically be less than 6%.
It is assumed that the opportunity cost of continued federal ownership of public
lands is the long-term yield on U.S. Treasury bonds on the land’s market value.
For the previous ten-year period, the average 20-year bond yielded was
approximately 6.2%, thus we considered this rate of return to be the alternative
if public lands were sold and the proceeds from land sales either reinvested or
used for the public good.
Results of the Management Policy Models for Public Land Surface Rights in the
U.S., Exhibits 1 and 2 above, and the overall high management and operating
expenses that are incurred by the BLM and USFS, Exhibit 6, raise serious
questions whether the USFS and BLM are fulﬁlling their respective ﬁduciary
obligations as stewards of those land parcels that contain little non-pecuniary or
multiple-use potential other than grazing lease income. Since a large proportion
of BLM land contains little multiple-use value other than grazing and are in many
cases surrounded by privately owned land, these parcels should each be evaluated
with respect to their future federal ownership.34
There are, of course, a contingent of policy advocates who assert that all
undeveloped land provides a degree of natural ecological preservation that has
value to society, and furthermore that the disposal of public lands, thus losing
public control of future use, represents the giving up of a future option that has
value. We recognize these arguments; however, it is our opinion that federal lands
that contain little multiple-use value other than grazing are being retained at
signiﬁcant expense to taxpayers and place signiﬁcant restrictions on western states,
where these lands are located. If all land possesses natural ecological preservation
that has value to society, why should we not have signiﬁcant tracts of public lands
in states other than those where most public lands are located?35
Our recommendation is that BLM lands containing signiﬁcant scenic/recreational
and other multiple-use attributes should be turned over to the USFS. The USFS
will retain an exclusive inventory of lands with scenic, recreational value, and
wildlife habitat, which will truly serve the multiple-use objective. The federal
government may then use the proceeds from the sale of less scenic lands to
consolidate and possibly purchase additional lands with scenic, recreational, and
wildlife habitat value for future multiple-use. By essentially eliminating the BLM
and consolidating truly multiple-use lands under the USFS, the existingFederal Public Land Surface Rights Management  139
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bureaucracy of the BLM can be merged with the bureaucracy of a potentially
smaller, more efﬁcient USFS. The net savings, subsequent to the consolidation,
could be $2 billion to $3 billion per year.
By consolidating and purchasing additional scenic, recreational, and wildlife
habitat lands under the USFS, the public will have access to even more land that
serves the multiple-use purpose. These actions will also give additional economic
control of less scenic lands to individual states and decrease the inequality of
public land policy on those 11 western states containing most public lands. The
concept of multiple-use should be reinforced for lands with scenic, wildlife habitat,
and/or recreational attributes and federal programs, such as encouraging the
purchase and retirement of grazing rights on the lands, should be encouraged.
However, the value and applicability of multiple-use is minimal for lands
containing little or no scenic and/or recreational value, their highest and best use,
which is normally agricultural grazing, may be continued under each state’s
administration.
For each parcel of federal public lands with grazing as the highest and best use,
AUM lease fees may be increased approaching comparable market rates, and the
current formula discarded. The policy model may be used to determine minimum
lease fees, which are necessary to continue ownership of lands containing little
other multiple-use value. A variable lease rate based on the productivity and
market value of each parcel of federal land may also be considered. We observe
that productivity, as measured by AUMs per acre, varies considerably across
Wyoming as it does across the western U.S. In some cases, where productivity is
low and land prices are relatively high, no reasonable lease fee will make
continuing to lease an economically viable alternative. Thus, we do not feel that
an alternative policy of marking grazing and other leases to market and exploring
ways of reducing operating costs are not viable alternatives.
 Endnotes
1 The federal government owns about 671.8 million acres (29.6%) of the 2.27 billion
acres of land in the U.S. Four agencies administer 628.4 million acres (93.5%) of this
land: the Forest Service in the Department of Agriculture, and the Bureau of Land
Management, Fish, and Wildlife Service, and National Park Service, all in the
Department of the Interior.
2 See http://www.sfrc.uﬂ.edu/Extension/ssfor11.htm.
3 BLM manages 261.5 million acres, and is responsible for 700 million acres of subsurface
mineral resources. BLM has a multiple-use, sustained-yield mandate that supports a
variety of uses and programs, including energy development, timber harvesting,
recreation, grazing, wild horses and burros, cultural resources, and conservation. USFS
manages 192.5 million acres also for multiple use and sustained yields of various
products and services, for example, timber harvesting, recreation, grazing, watershed
protection, and ﬁsh and wildlife habitats.
4 The USFS and BLM manage both sub-surface mineral and surface leasing and royalty
collection functions. Substantial income is generated from mineral royalties. However,140  Spahr and Sunderman
this is irrelevant to the study since the general practice, even if the surface rights of a
land parcel is sold, the agency would normally retain all mineral rights. It is assumed
that this practice will continue in the future for any surface rights sold.
5 This paper address management policies on Federal agency administered public lands
by drawing heavily on previous work by Torell and Fowler (1986), Sunderman and
Spahr (1994), Spahr and Sunderman (1995), Torell and Drummond (1997), Spahr and
Sunderman (1998,1999), Torell and Bailey (2000), Sunderman, Spahr, Birch, and Oster
(2000), Torell, Rimbey, Bartlett, Van Tassell, and Tanaka (2001), Moskowitz and
Romaniello (2002), Sunderman, Spahr, and Runyan (2004) and Sunderman and Spahr
(2006).
6 See http://www.blm.gov/nhp/facts/index.htm and http://www.fs.fed.us/.
7 See http://www.blm.gov/nhp/news/releases/pages/2005/pr050207 grazing.htm. An
animal unit month (AUM) is a standardized measure of forage necessary to sustain a
mature cow with calf, a horse, or ﬁve sheep for one month. Leased AUMs include a
combination of USFS, BLM, and STL.
8 See http://www.ams.usda.gov/.
9 The percentages of value do not add to 100%, since other attributes also add value. A
signiﬁcant body of literature exists, which attempts to determine the value of recreation
and other attributes of public lands (e.g., Bhat et al., 1998).
10 Much of the public land in question is already an integral part of an agricultural
operation and is surrounded by private land that leases for signiﬁcantly higher rates. We
feel that public land with very similar attributes to private lands should have essentially
the same lease values. Thus, using market comparisons for similar parcels is hedonic
modeling. Since the transfer of private grazing leases in the sale of private lands has no
statistically signiﬁcant effect on the price of the land (as shown later in Exhibit 4), we
assume that private grazing leases are fairly priced.
11 To allow wildlife, deer, buffalo, mustangs, and elk, to graze on these smaller parcels
would be infringing on the right of private ownership. Should the fact that much of the
land in western states is owned by the public suggest that we, the public, should infringe
on private ownership of these lands more than we infringe on private ownership in other
states that have little or no public lands? This is the ecological and environmental
question regarding public versus private rights in different states.
12 These studies realized that risk differences exist between U.S. Treasuries and returns on
leased public lands; however, returns on public lands were compared with returns on
the most likely investment that proceeds from the sale of these lands would be reinvested
in—U.S. Treasuries. Given, in these studies, that U.S. Treasury returns stochastically
dominate (ﬁrst-order stochastic dominance) lease returns, this would seem to be
sufﬁcient incentive for considering the sale and reinvestment alternative.
13 There may be other alternatives that would improve management efﬁciency and
effectiveness. The model may also assess the beneﬁt/costs of these other modiﬁcations
of land use. A viable alternative may include turning control of some parcels over to
the states in which the parcel is located.
14 There may be valid concerns that if these federal lands were sold, the proceeds of the
sales would not be used for the public beneﬁt, but rather would likely be squandered.
However, if Congress and the president were to ‘‘squander’’ the proceeds from the sale
of public lands, this is irrelevant to our paper. Speciﬁc to Wyoming, proceeds from the
sales of all school trust lands are invested in the State Trust Minerals and the StateFederal Public Land Surface Rights Management  141
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Permanent Land Fund (http://slf-web.state.wy.us/). We suggest that Congress establish
a fund similar to the State of Wyoming Permanent Land Fund to beneﬁt the public for
a longer term. However, what Congress and the president do with regard to their
ﬁduciary responsibilities to the assets of the country do not justify continued
mismanagement of current assets.
15 In addition to the ﬁxed income stream from reinvested sales proceeds to the state if
lands were sold are property tax revenues, which are not collected on federal lands.
Currently, states receive payment in lieu of taxes on federal lands to replace property
taxes. Once the sale has occurred and the land is privately owned, property tax payments
will begin.
16 The ﬁrst, second, and fourth terms on the right side of the equation represent the present
value of a growing annuity for lease fees, expenses, and payment in lieu of taxes until
the land is sold at time t. The third term represents the present value of the perpetual
stream of earnings from the reinvestment of public land sales proceeds subsequent to a
sale at time t.
17 We ﬁnd that t*, under most circumstances, is to either immediately sell the land or never
sell the land. We feel that a visual inspection of the graphs are sufﬁcient to assess
management policy since, in most cases, the present value of continued ownership is
monotonically decreasing. This suggests that, from a pecuniary value only assessment,
the land should be sold immediately. The justiﬁcation for retaining ownership of a given
tract of public land must lie with non-pecuniary values, such as esthetic multiple-use
values to the public.
18 Sales in Teton County, home of Grand Teton and Yellowstone National Parks, are
excluded due to extreme land values. Land in Teton County, even though currently used
for ranching, is valued based on factors other than for ranching. All sales were of private
land where BLM or Forest Service leases may be included in the sale. Some of the
sales, however, consisted of only BLM or Forest Service leases.
19 For example, see Martin and Jefferies (1966), Winter and Whittaker (1981), Sunderman
and Spahr (1994, 2006), and Sunderman, Spahr, and Runyan (2004).
20 A recent study using data from Wyoming by Bastian and Hewlett (1997) found that the
AUMs per acre ranged greatly across the state. For example, grazing land had a statewide
productivity of 0.29 AUMs per acre, whereas irrigated cropland had a measure of
productivity of 9.19.
21 The authors determined the subjective assessment of scenic and/or recreational value,
on a scale of 1 to 5, with assistance from appraisers from the Farm Credit Services
ofﬁces in Casper and Worland, Wyoming. It is realized that it is difﬁcult to test the
reliability and validity of the scenic and/or recreational variable; however, because of
the variable’s signiﬁcance and consistency in the hedonic model, it is our judgment that
the variable is economically important and reliable.
22 In the Bryan and Colwell (1982) approach, there is one variable to represent the
beginning of each of the years in the analysis period. The two dummies closest to the
sale date are assigned values that sum to unity, with the two values being proportionate
in each case to the closeness of the sale to that year’s beginning and end. The resulting
estimated path of price is a point on a log-linear function that moves smoothly from the
beginning of each year to the beginning of the next year. Shifts in log-linear slope occur
only at the beginning of each new year. The system provides more annual ﬂexibility
than linear or quadratic movements, being essentially an unconventional piecewise linear
technique, with nodes at each year end within the period analyzed.142  Spahr and Sunderman
23 Since we assume that all sales take place in the middle of the month, to arrive at the
weights, September 15, 1990 is 2.5 months from July 1, 1990 so B90S2  2.5/6 or
0.583. Since September 15, 1990 is 3.5 months away from January 1, 1991, B91S1 
3.5/6 or 0.417.
24 See Neter, Wasserman, and Kutner (1983) for a discussion of this concept.
25 Removing the outliers resulted in an increase in adjusted R
2 from 0.7638 to 0.8990;
however, all signiﬁcant variables remained signiﬁcant when outliers were removed.
Removing sales outliers did not make a major change in results; however, since the
objective of the model is to estimate fair market values and capital appreciation rates,
it was our opinion that deleting the outliers improves the predictive accuracy of the
model even though coefﬁcients may be biased relative to alternative coefﬁcients
estimated from the full sample.
26 The model was also estimated with an intercept and it was veriﬁed that the intercept is
captured in each time variable. All coefﬁcients remained the same and each date of sale
variable was increased by the amount of the intercept, thus causing no change in our
results.
27 Variance inﬂation factors, one for each explanatory variable, measure the extent to which
variances of the estimated regression coefﬁcients are inﬂated as compared to the variance
if explanatory variables were not linearly related. The largest factor among the variables
is used as the indicator of the severity of multicollinearity. For a discussion of VIF, see
Neter, Wasserman, and Kutner (1983).
28 See Sunderman and Spahr (1994), Spahr and Sunderman (1995, 1998), and Sunderman,
Spahr, Birch, and Oster (2000).
29 Winter and Whittaker (1981), Torell and Fowler (1986), Sunderman and Spahr (1994),
and Spahr and Sunderman (1995, 1998) all found that appraisers valued permanent
improvements less than their effect on the sales price, which is consistent with current
ﬁndings.
30 Given the assumptions, the following variables were needed to arrive at the price per
acre: (1) ecoregion, (2) QUALITY, (3) scenic area, and (4) date of sale. The formula
used is:
Price Per Acre  63.679 (LDACRES)  53.107(ECO4)
 63.896(ECO5)  226.112(ECO7)  42.081(ECO8)
 98.581(ECO9)  28.646(QUALITY)  13.669(FAIR)
 105.421(AVERAGE)  281.396(GOOD)
 320.805(EXCELLENT)  833.920(B03S1).
The LDACRES variable was used for a section, 640 acres, as most STL consist of a
section of land. Price per acre is then multiplied by 640 to calculate the value of a
section. Since we are arriving at an estimate of price per acre as of January, 2003, the
value for B03S1 is 1.Federal Public Land Surface Rights Management  143
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31 The annual appreciation rate was obtained by ﬁtting a least squares linear regression
model to the date of sale variables for each six-month time period (29 different periods
from 1989 through ﬁrst quarter 2003). Regression of the date of sale variable resulted
in an estimated appreciation rate of 7.26% and regressing the natural log of the date of
sale variable resulted in an estimated appreciation rate of 6.62%. The growth rate for
each ecoregion was obtained by estimating the least squares predicted value of the school
section in July 1989 and ending, January 2003 and applying the following expression:
t (1r)  V /V , January 2003 July 1989
where r is equal to the annual compound rate of growth and t is the annual periods or
13.5 years. There are actually 14.5 years of data; however, estimated growth rates we
calculated as one half year from the beginning and end dates of data.
32 These returns are higher than actual returns to beneﬁciaries since no adjustments were
made for administrative expenses.
33 Fence out states, such as Wyoming, have statutes requiring landowners to build fences
to keep cattle off their property rather than requiring cattle owners to fence in their
cattle. These statutes remain as a result of the open range history of the state.
34 The authors are assuming that rates of appreciation on public lands are similar to rates
estimated on private lands given that these lands were sold. We are not recommending
that public lands with signiﬁcant multiple-use value be sold; however, the value of these
lands in the private market, without the use restrictions imposed under USFS or BLM
ownership is the correct value to use in estimating a rate of return and for a beneﬁt/
cost assessment.
35 Obviously, there may be some real option value whenever an irreversible decision is
made. However, as with the real option literature in corporate ﬁnance, many decisions
are not irreversible, thus substantially reducing real option value. Government, through
the right of eminent domain that may be used to acquire properties for the public beneﬁt,
may signiﬁcantly reduce real option value relative to an equivalent sale in the private
sector.
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